

# 40th Australasian Economic Theory Workshop Schedule

H.W. Arndt Building (Kingsley St, Acton)

Wednesday	Lecture Theatre 1		Lecture Theatre 2	
9:15 AM	Welcome (Lecture Theatre 1)			
9:30 AM				
10:00 AM	Session 1a: Auctions		Session 1b: Voting	
10:30 AM				
11:00 AM	Morning Tea			
11:30 AM				
12:00 PM	Session 2a: Tournaments and Contests		Session 2b: Allocation Problems	
12:30 PM				
1:00 PM	Lunch			
1:30 PM				
2:00 PM	Session 3a: Market Matching (School Choice)		Session 3b: Symmetry, Unanimity and Incentive Design	
2:30 PM				
3:00 PM				
3:30 PM	Afternoon Tea			
4:00 PM				
4:30 PM	Session 4a: Persuasion		Session 4b: Dynamics and Partial Observability	
5:00 PM				
7:00 PM	Dinner (Lena Karmel Lodge, 3 Rimmer St)			

Thursday	Lecture Theatre 1		Lecture Theatre 2	
9:00 AM	Plenary talk: Saito (Lecture Theatre 1)			
9:30 AM				
10:00 AM	Morning Tea			
10:30 AM				
11:00 AM	Session 5a: Mechanism Design (Jobs and Task Design)		Session 5b: Theory and Experiments	
11:30 AM				
12:00 PM	Lunch			
12:30 PM				
1:00 PM	Session 6a: Search and Information		Session 6b: Bargaining and Trade	
1:30 PM				
2:00 PM				
2:30 PM	Afternoon Tea			
3:00 PM	Plenary talk: Vierø (Lecture Theatre 1)			
3:30 PM				
4:00 PM				
4:30 PM				
5:00 PM				

Name	Affiliation	Paper
<b>1a Auctions (Wednesday, 9:30 to 11:00, Lecture Theatre 1)</b>		
GVA Dharanan	UNSW	Equilibrium in Asymmetric Auctions
Fengxian He	JD Explore Academy	Advances of Permutation Equivariance in Deep Learning-aided Auction Mechanisms
Allan Hernandez Chanto	UQ	On the Prevalence of Small Reserve Prices in Standard Auctions
<b>1b Voting (Wednesday, 9:30 to 11:00, Lecture Theatre 2)</b>		
Ratul Das Chaudhury	Monash	Influencing a Polarized and Connected Legislature
Shino Takayama	UQ	The Strategy of Single Transferable Vote
Simona Fabrizi	Auckland	Voting Behaviour with an Asymmetric Loss Function
<b>2a Tournaments and Contests (Wednesday, 11:30 to 13:00, Lecture Theatre 1)</b>		
Ben Chen	Sydney	Contests with Generic Behavioral Success Functions
Jun Zhang	UTS	Tournaments with reserve performance
Idione Meneghel	ANU	Paying to Overbid
<b>2b Allocation problems (Wednesday, 11:30 to 13:00, Lecture Theatre 2)</b>		
Nawaaz Khalfan	U Penn	Optimal Allocation with Noisy Inspection
Yuki Tamura	NYU Abu Dhabi	A Characterization of Obviously Strategy-proof Rules for Object Reallocation Problems with Single-peaked Preferences
Simon Loertscher	Melbourne	Efficient Trade on Networks
<b>3a Market Matching: School Choice (Wednesday, 14:00 to 15:30, Lecture Theatre 1)</b>		
Isa Hafalir	UTS	Efficient Market Design with Distributional Policies
Andy McLennan	UQ	An Efficient School Choice Mechanism Based on a Generalization of Hall's Marriage Theorem
Kentaro Tomoeda	UTS	Tie-breaking or Not: A Choice Function Approach
<b>3b Symmetry, Unanimity and Incentive Design (Wednesday, 14:00 to 15:30, Lecture Theatre 2)</b>		
DJ Thornton	UNSW	The Geometry and Group Theory of Symmetry in Games
Matthew Ryan	Auckland University of Technology	Unanimity under Ambiguity
Onur Kesten	Sydney	Blood Allocation with Replacement Donors: Theory and Application
<b>4a Persuasion (Wednesday, 16:00 to 17:00, Lecture Theatre 1)</b>		
Gregory Kubitz	QUT	Strategic self-persuasion
Anastasia Burkovskaya	Sydney	Dictator's Media
<b>4b Dynamics and Partial Observability (Wednesday, 16:00 to 17:00, Lecture Theatre 1)</b>		
Guillaume Roger	Sydney	Dynamic contracting with imperfect observability
Yuqing Liu	UQ	A Minskyite Model of Financial Crises

**5a Mechanism design: Jobs and Task Design (Thursday, 10:30 to 12:00, Lecture Theatre 1)**

Vladimir Smirnov	Sydney	Microfoundations of work intensification and burnout
Luis Vasconcelos	UTS	Optimal Job Design and Information Elicitation
Alexander Rodivilov	Stevens Institute of Technology	Optimal task design: production and learning with moral hazard and adverse selection

**5b Theory and Experiments (Thursday, 10:30 to 12:00, Lecture Theatre 2)**

Georgy Artemov	Melbourne	Improving Information Acquisition in School Choice: Theory and an Experiment
Steffen Lippert	Auckland	Group size and Pledge-and-Review bargaining
Evan Calford	ANU	Violations of the Reversal of Order Axiom

**6a Search and Information (Thursday, 13:00 to 14:30, Lecture Theatre 1)**

Christopher Teh	UNSW	Level-K Information Design
Yijuan Chen	ANU	Post-search Uncertainty, Product Heterogeneity, and Price Divergence
Diego Carrasco Novoa	UQ	Pandora with Multi-Unit Search

**6b Bargaining and Trade (Thursday, 13:00 to 14:30, Lecture Theatre 2)**

Antonio Rosato	UQ	Taste Projection in Bilateral Trade
Metin Uyanik	UQ	Endogenous Agenda in Collective Sales with Quota
Toan Le	Melbourne	A theory of incomplete information bargaining weights based on Nash bargaining

**General Information**

Presentations will run for a total of 30 minutes each (25 minutes presentation, 5 minutes discussion).  
Plenary talks will run for a total of 60 minutes each (50 minutes presentation, 10 minutes discussion).  
Final speaker of each session will act as the chair for the session.

Morning tea, Lunch and Afternoon tea will be held in the foyer area outside the lecture theaters.

Dinner will be held at ANU Commons, address Lena Karmel Lodge, 3 Rimmer St, Canberra ACT 2601.