Game Theory; Microeconomic Theory; Dynamic games; Mechanism design; Organizational economics.
Ruitian Lang is a Lecturer in Economics. Ruitian is a microeconomic theorist interested in dynamic games studying people’s behaviour when they interact more than once and are forward-looking. He also is interested in mechanism design theory, studying the design of sales contracts, auctions or other mechanisms when participants possess private information. In the formal aspect of the mechanism design, he studies mechanisms in which participants must decide whether to acquire more, costly information before entering the mechanisms. In the applied aspect, he studies the dynamics of policy making as well as the implication of negotiation theory for industrial organistion, especially procurement problems. Ruitan has published in top field journals including Journal of Economic Theory and American Journal of Economics: Microeconomics.
Kawai, Keiichi, R. Lang and H. Li (2018), “Political Kludges.” American Journal of Economics: Microeconomics, 10(4), 131-158.
Lang, Ruitian (2019), “Try before you buy: a theory of dynamic information acquisition.” Journal of Economic Theory, 183, 1057-1093.
See downloadable working papers on https://ruitian-lang.jimdosite.com
- Bargaining with Variable Disagreement Values (with Kieron Meagher)
- Bidding by invitation: when auctions are no good
- Renegotiation with ex-post competition in procurement (with Kieron Meagher)
- Optimal Informal Incentives and Long-Run Dynamics in a Fluctuating Environment
- Relationships in a Market: Contract Enforcement and Asset Re-allocation
Coordinator of the Economic Theory Workshop at ANU.
EMET7001 Mathematical Techniques for Economic Analysis
ECON8013 Optimization in Economics and Financial Economics
ECON4411/8011 Microeconomic Theory
EMET8012 Business and Economic Forecasting