Sai Gedipudi

Date icon 14 Dec 2026
Time icon 12pm - 1pm
Location icon
Fred Gruen Economics Seminar Room (H.W. Arndt Bldg 25A)
Cost icon
FREE

last seminar of 2026

Strategic vaccination behaviour and vaccination policy

This thesis examines strategic vaccination behaviour when the vaccine carries a risk of a severe adverse event and agents differ in age, which determines their vulnerability to a deadly disease. We characterise vaccination decisions in laissez-faire equilibrium and under two policy goals: minimising total mortality and expected years of life lost. 

The thesis begins with an overview of the institutional and policy context of vaccination, including evidence on vaccine benefits, risks, effectiveness, and vaccination coverage. It also discusses the role of public policies in influencing vaccination behaviour.

We begin the game-theoretic analysis by considering a vaccine that provides perfect protection against infection. Vaccination decisions in equilibrium and under both policy goals are characterised by age cutoffs: depending on how disease vulnerability varies with age, agents above or below the cutoff are vaccinated. Both policy goals require higher vaccination coverage than arises in laissez-faire because vaccination generates positive externalities. However, either policy goal can require higher vaccination coverage than the other, depending on how disease vulnerability varies with age. 

We then consider an imperfect vaccine, distinguishing between protection against infection and protection against mortality. We assume that disease vulnerability increases with age. In laissez-faire, greater mortality protection increases vaccine uptake, but greater infection protection can reduce uptake when mortality protection is sufficiently high. Under either policy goal, increases in one measure of protection can reduce vaccine uptake when the other is sufficiently high. However, both total mortality and expected years of life lost decrease as either measure of protection increases. Universal vaccination coverage, which does not arise with a perfectly effective vaccine, can arise with an imperfect vaccine under both policy goals and, under stronger conditions, in laissez-faire.

Finally, we examine the implementation of age-based vaccination mandates, considering voting and imperfect compliance. We identify conditions under which voting can implement either the mortality-minimising cutoff or a universal mandate. With a fixed compliance rate, stricter mandates crowd out voluntary vaccination but increase total vaccine uptake and reduce the susceptible proportion. Moreover, for any positive compliance rate, introducing a mandate sufficiently close to the laissez-faire cutoff reduces total mortality. When compliance varies with age and mandate strictness, stricter mandates can instead increase voluntary vaccination and, under certain conditions, total mortality.

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